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According to a recent meta-analysis, religious priming has a positive effect on prosocial
behavior (Shariff et al., 2015). We first argue that this meta-analysis suffers from a
number of methodological shortcomings that limit the conclusions that can be drawn
about the potential benefits of religious priming. Next we present a re-analysis of
the religious priming data using two different meta-analytic techniques. A Precision-
Effect Testing–Precision-Effect-Estimate with Standard Error (PET-PEESE) meta-analysis
suggests that the effect of religious priming is driven solely by publication bias. In
contrast, an analysis using Bayesian bias correction suggests the presence of a religious
priming effect, even after controlling for publication bias. These contradictory statistical
results demonstrate that meta-analytic techniques alone may not be sufficiently robust
to firmly establish the presence or absence of an effect. We argue that a conclusive
resolution of the debate about the effect of religious priming on prosocial behavior – and
about theoretically disputed effects more generally – requires a large-scale, preregistered
replication project, which we consider to be the sole remedy for the adverse effects of
experimenter bias and publication bias.
Keywords: religious priming, prosocial behavior, meta-analysis, PET-PEESE, Bayesian Bias Correction,
preregistration
Does religion make nicer people? The answer to this important question bears on fundamental
views about the evolution of religion and the adaptive value of supernatural beliefs (Norenzayan
et al., 2014). Evolutionary accounts of religion have proposed that belief in supernatural
agents is either a by-product of ordinary cognitive faculties, or that religious beliefs directly
confer an adaptive advantage (Pyysiäinen and Hauser, 2010). According to the latter view,
beliefs in an invisible supernatural agent who rewards good behaviors and who punishes
moral transgressions provided a solution to the “freerider problem”: individuals may try to
obtain the beneﬁts from being considered a group member without contributing to the group.
When societies increased in size, the freerider problem became more apparent because it was
impossible to track the behavior of all individuals in the group. Accordingly, it is pointed out
that the belief in “moral gods” ﬁrst appeared when people started living in city-states. The
continuous feeling of being watched by a supernatural agent enforced moral and prosocial
behavior.
The adaptationist view of religious beliefs is gainingmore andmore empirical support as a result
of studies showing a relation between religion and prosociality. When using self-report measures,
religious participants typically report stronger prosocial attitudes and more prosocial behavior
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than non-religious participants. However, when it comes to actual
behavioral measures (e.g., performance in economic decision
games) the answer is less straightforward: religious participants
appear equally altruistic (or egoistic) as their non-religious
counterparts, and if they donate money at all, they do so
preferably to ingroup members (Galen, 2012).
Conceptual priming has been introduced as an important
methodological innovation to overcome problems inherent to
self-report measures (Bargh, 2006). In an inﬂuential paper,
Shariﬀ and Norenzayan (2007) found that when participants
were implicitly primed with religious concepts, they donated
more money in an economic decision game. This eﬀect has
been interpreted as supporting the “supernatural monitoring
hypothesis”: the activation of religious concepts induces the
feeling of a supernatural agent that monitors our behavior
(Norenzayan et al., 2014). In turn, the feeling of “being watched”
fosters moral and prosocial behavior.
Following discussions on the reliability of conceptual priming
techniques and the potential ﬁle-drawer problem in the ﬁeld (e.g.,
Francis, 2012), Shariﬀ et al. (2015) have recently conducted a
meta-analysis on the eﬀects of religious priming. The authors
conclude that (1) when taking into account both published and
unpublished studies, religious priming exerts a small though
reliable eﬀect on behavioral measures; (2) religious priming is
mainly eﬀective for religious participants (i.e., religiosity is an
important moderator of the priming eﬀect); and (3) explicit
priming techniques (e.g., using a contextual manipulation,
such as conducting the experiment in a church or presenting
participants with the ‘call for prayer’) result in stronger eﬀects
than implicit priming techniques (e.g., using subliminal primes
or a scrambled sentence task).
These ﬁndings may seem to support the notion of religious
priming in particular and the use of conceptual priming
techniques in general, and Shariﬀ et al. (2015) are to be
commended for their eﬀort in taking this important initiative.
However, despite the authors’ best eﬀorts, several methodological
and statistical concerns remain. In our opinion, these concerns
strongly limit the inferences that may be drawn from this
meta-analysis. Moreover, we re-analyzed the Shariﬀ et al.
(2015) data using two alternative meta-analytic techniques
that seek to correct for publication bias [i.e., the Precision-
Eﬀect Testing–Precision-Eﬀect-Estimate with Standard Error
(PET-PEESE) method and a Bayesian bias correction (BBC)
method]. These two alternative meta-analyses yield opposing
conclusions, a result that reinforces our opinion that meta-
analyses alone cannot conclusively establish the reliability
and replicability of theoretically disputed eﬀects (see also
Wagenmakers et al., 2015). The main reason for our skepticism,
however, is that overall eﬀect size estimates from a meta-analysis
result from the combination of a possible true eﬀect and a
spurious eﬀect that reﬂects the inﬂuence of both publication
bias and experimenter bias (e.g., Barber, 1976; John et al.,
2012). To establish the robustness of psychological eﬀects
without the confounding inﬂuence of such biases, we argue for
the use of large-scale and preregistered replication attempts,
as facilitated for instance by the Open Science Framework
(OSF).
Methodological and Statistical Concerns
Here we list ﬁve concerns with the meta-analysis conducted
by Shariﬀ et al. (2015), all of which we believe reduce the
evidential impact of the results. First, the authors report a
negative correlation between sample size and eﬀect size, with
high-powered studies showing an eﬀect size that hovers around
zero. The authors note that almost all meta-analyses show a
similar negative relation between sample size and eﬀect size; to us,
this suggests that the results are contaminated by publication bias
(e.g., the tendency to report low-N studies only when these yield a
signiﬁcant result) and/or questionable research practices (QRPs;
e.g., optional stopping when the p-value approaches 0.05). Note
that the observed association between sample size and eﬀect size
alone does not allow one to determine the relative contribution
of publication bias and/or QRPs. Thus, our main concern is that
studies with larger sample sizes tend to provide a more accurate
estimate of the true eﬀect size, and that these estimates are close
to zero.
It should be acknowledged that the authors used the ‘trim-
and-ﬁll’ method to correct for publication bias. However, as
argued in detail elsewhere (Simonsohn et al., 2014), this method
rests on the unlikely assumption that selective reporting is related
to researchers being hesitant to report small eﬀect sizes, whereas
in practice results are left unreported because the p-value does not
reach the critical threshold of 0.05. Below we report the outcomes
of two alternative meta-analytic procedures, namely PET-PEESE
(e.g., Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014) and the BBC method
(Guan andVandekerckhove, 2015) to correct for publication bias.
A second concern is that Shariﬀ et al. (2015) may have relied
on overly selective inclusion criteria and have failed to specify the
reasons why speciﬁc (unpublished) studies were excluded from
the ﬁnal analysis. By only including a select subset of studies, the
observed eﬀect size may be severely overestimated. For instance,
the Appendix of the Shariﬀ et al. (2015) meta-analysis lists studies
that were excluded because no ‘neutral’ prime condition was
included, but it is unclear how this criterion was deﬁned (e.g.,
why should a ‘sports prime’ be more neutral than a ‘student
prime’ or an ‘animal prime’ condition?). Moreover, a quick online
search reveals that at least 14 unpublished manuscripts reporting
studies on religious priming could have been included in the
meta-analysis (see the Appendix to the present paper). All these
manuscripts were available before 2014. Of these 14 studies, four
report positive evidence for religious priming, eight report mixed
evidence (i.e., the eﬀect is only observed for a speciﬁc sub-group
such as males or the eﬀect is in an unexpected direction), and two
report a null-result.
Our third concern relates to the analysis of the possible
moderator of religiosity. Shariﬀ et al. (2015) note that the small
eﬀect sizes for religious priming eﬀects on prosocial behaviormay
be related to the (lack of) religiosity of the participants involved
in the studies. In support of this hypothesis, the authors report
a stronger eﬀect size for religious compared to non-religious
participants. However, the concerns mentioned above apply even
more to the small subset of studies that were included in this
“religiosity-as-moderator” analysis: a strong negative relation
between eﬀect size and sample size and an incomplete selection
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of studies. For instance, we recently reported six experiments
showing a null-eﬀect of religious priming for both religious and
non-religious participants (Van Elk et al., 2014; a paper excluded
from the meta-analysis).
A fourth concern is that Shariﬀ et al. (2015) did not control
for important and well-established determinants of prosocial
behavior such as gender, education, and socio-economic status
(cf. Eagly, 2009; Piﬀ et al., 2010). It should be noted that the
meta-analysis was based on studies in which participants were
randomly assigned to the experimental or the control condition.
We also note that controlling for demographic variables in a
meta-analysis may be diﬃcult. Nevertheless, as we argue below,
pre-registered replication studies should attempt to control for
important determinants of prosocial behavior and investigate
the extent to which religious priming exerts an additional eﬀect
beyond individual diﬀerences in prosocial behavior.
A ﬁfth concern is evident from a consideration of the forest
plot depicted in Shariﬀ et al. (2015; Figure 1). The forest plot
shows that the conﬁdence intervals (CIs) for the eﬀect sizes of
the individual studies are quite large (mean width of CI = 0.92),
whereas, at the same time, for the majority of studies the lower
bound of the CI lies just above zero (mean range of CI = [0.0–
0.91]); for instance, the CI of 35% of the studies is in the interval
[0.0–0.1]. Given the uncertainty in the estimation of the CI, such
a pattern is statistically unlikely and – similar to the association
between sample size and eﬀect size discussed above – it suggests
biased reporting of the observed eﬀects (Schimmack, 2012;
Francis, 2013; but see: Morey, 2013; Simonsohn, 2013). In order
to obtain an alternative to the ‘trim-and-ﬁll’ estimate of eﬀect size
in the presence of publication bias and selective reporting, we
applied the PET-PEESE (e.g., Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014)
and the BBC method (Guan and Vandekerckhove, 2015) to the
eﬀect sizes reported by Shariﬀ et al. (2015). The outcomes of these
analyses are described below.
FIGURE 1 | Fit of the Precision-Effect Testing (PET) model to all
religious priming studies (k = 92) in the meta-analysis by Shariff et al.
(2015).
Re-Analysis I: The PET-PEESE Method
The PET-PEESE procedure involves two regression models, PET
(Stanley, 2005) and PEESE (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007) and
a rule to decide which of the two models should be used1.
The PET model (Stanley, 2005) is based on Egger’s regression
test (Egger et al., 1997) and regresses the observed eﬀect sizes on
their corresponding SE. The intuition is as follows: in the absence
of publication bias, there is no relation between the SE of a study
and the reported eﬀect size; consequently, a plot with SE on the
x-axis and reported eﬀect size on the y-axis will show a random
scattering of points around a horizontal line that corresponds
to the true underlying eﬀect size. The variance of this scattering
depends on the SE: eﬀect sizes from studies with small SE will
cluster closely around the true value, but, as the SE increases, so
does the variance of the observed eﬀect sizes. With regard to the
regression model, this inherent heterogeneity of error variance
necessitates a weighted least squares regression model where the
weights correspond to the inverse of the squared SE.
In the presence of publication bias, however, the pattern
of results will be diﬀerent. Publication bias means that non-
signiﬁcant results will tend not to be published, and this results in
a positive correlation between SE and eﬀect sizes: low-N studies
have a relatively large SE, and they require larger eﬀect sizes to
obtain signiﬁcant results. In the PET model, the slope coeﬃcient
quantiﬁes publication bias (i.e., a positive slope indicates that
publication bias is present) and the intercept coeﬃcient estimates
the true eﬀect corrected for publication bias (i.e., the intercept
corresponds to an idealized study with “zero” SE).
The PEESE model (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007) diﬀers
from the PET model in that it regresses the eﬀect sizes on the
squared SE. The PEESE model performs better in the presence
of a true eﬀect, whereas the PET model performs better in the
absence of a true eﬀect (e.g., Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014).
Consequently, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2014) proposed to use
the intercept of the PET model as the estimate of the true eﬀect
whenever this intercept is non-signiﬁcant and to use the intercept
of the PEESE model otherwise.
Figure 1 shows the results of applying the PET-PEESE
procedure to the 92 religious priming studies analyzed by Shariﬀ
et al. (2015). The coeﬃcients for PET were b0 = –0.002, p= 0.97,
95% CI [–0.118, 0.114] and b1 = 1.982, p< 0.001, 95% CI [1.304,
2.552]. Since the intercept b0 was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, the PET-PEESE estimate of the true underlying eﬀect
is –0.002. Furthermore, the signiﬁcant positive slope b1 suggests
the presence of publication bias.
Figure 2 shows the result of applying the PET-PEESE
procedure to the subset of 25 religious priming studies that
investigated eﬀects on prosocial behavior. The coeﬃcients for
PET were b0 = –0.169, p = 0.153, 95% CI [–0.406, 0.067]
and b1 = 2.380, p = 0.003, 95% CI [0.876, 3.883]. Since the
intercept b0 was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the PET-
PEESE estimate of the true underlying eﬀect is –0.169. Again, the
1We thank Daniel Lakens for calling our attention to the advantages of the
PET-PEESE analysis. For a recent critical discussion on the limitations of
the PET-PEESE method, see http://willgervais.com/blog/2015/6/25/putting-pet-
peese-to-the-test-1.
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FIGURE 2 | Fit of the PET model to the subset of the religious priming
studies explicitly focusing on the priming of prosocial behavior
(k = 25) in the meta-analysis by Shariff et al. (2015).
signiﬁcant positive slope b1 suggests the presence of publication
bias.
To summarize, when we corrected for publication bias by
applying the PET-PEESEmethod, we were unable to conﬁrm the
results reported by Shariﬀ et al. (2015). The PET-PEESE estimates
provided no evidence for a positive eﬀect of religious priming
on prosocial behavior; if anything, the bias-corrected PET-PEESE
eﬀect size is slightly negative.
Re-Analysis II: The Bayesian Bias
Correction Method
An alternative approach that can account for the eﬀects
of publication bias was recently developed by Guan and
Vandekerckhove (2015). This novel approach is based on a
Bayesian procedure that assumes one or several biasing processes
may have been at play while the papers were being published.
These behavioral processes are then quantiﬁed, and Bayesian
inference is applied to estimate the probability that each of
the processes was active. Conditional on each process, an
updated eﬀect size is computed, and these eﬀect sizes are
ﬁnally averaged with the model probabilities as weights (a
procedure known as Bayesian model averaging, e.g., Hoeting
et al., 1999).
We applied the BBC method to the eﬀect size estimates
reported by Shariﬀ et al. (2015). In order to conduct a Bayesian
analysis, we are required to make explicit our prior assumptions
regarding the relative likelihood of eﬀect sizes. For the current
analysis, we used as prior a normal distribution centered on 0,
with SD equal to 2/3 (which implies that eﬀect sizes are equally
likely to be less or greater than 0.45 in absolute value). We note
that although the Bayes factor is somewhat sensitive to the exact
deﬁnition of the prior, the results in this case were qualitatively
the same for all prior SDwithin a reasonable range (we tested SDs
as small as 1/10). Furthermore, it should be noted that the BBC
method is currently limited to homogeneous underlying eﬀect
sizes, a limitation that may be particularly pressing in the current
context.
The outcome of the BBC diverged from that of PET-PEESE.
In the full set of religious priming studies, BBC indicated the
presence a real eﬀect in addition to the presence of publication
bias (see Figure 3). In the prosocial subset, BBC indicated the
presence of a real eﬀect and very little evidence for publication
bias. In both cases, the evidence for the existence of a real eﬀect
was judged to be very strong.
Limitations of a Meta-Analysis
As the outcomes from our re-analyses demonstrate, diﬀerent
meta-analytic techniques can lead to opposite conclusions.
According to the BBC and the trim-and-ﬁll method, religious
priming indeed makes people more prosocial. In contrast,
according to the PET-PEESE method, there is no eﬀect of
religious priming on prosocial behavior. So what can we conclude
from all this? Wewould like to highlight two points before ending
with a general recommendation for future studies on religious
priming.
First, as discussed above, the Shariﬀ et al. (2015) meta-analysis
suﬀers from selection bias with respect to the studies that were
included. In addition, all meta-analytic methods converged on
the conclusion that publication bias indeed plagues the ﬁeld of
religious priming. The diﬀerent meta-analytic techniques rely on
diﬀerent assumptions and by using alternative ways of correcting
for publication bias, they may lead to diﬀerent bias-corrected
eﬀect size estimates. The choice for one method over another may
be guided by theoretical considerations (most of the authors of
the current paper have a preference for the Bayesian method),
but because the true extent of publication bias is unknown, the
question as to which method provides the most accurate estimate
of the true eﬀect size remains open.
Second, in the absence of preregistration, the outcome of
each individual study that was included in the meta-analysis is
prone to QRPs (e.g., John et al., 2012), experimenter expectancy
eﬀects, biases due to motivated reasoning, and biases due to
optional stopping during data collection (i.e., continuing the
analysis until the desired result is found). Such biases can express
themselves through selection procedures such as excluding
participants that do not show the eﬀect, reporting only those
measures that show an eﬀect, promoting pilot experiments to
main studies whenever the initial results are promising, etc. (e.g.,
De Groot, 1956/2014). Thus, when a meta-analysis is conducted
on studies that have not been preregistered, the resulting eﬀects
are a mix of possible true eﬀects and eﬀects that are due to
experimenter bias. Scientists are prone to many implicit and
explicit cognitive biases that skew their methods and results
(Podsakoﬀ et al., 2003). A meta-analysis relies on the observed
eﬀect sizes, and cannot disentangle eﬀects that are real from
those that are the result of human bias in reporting and analysis.
Hence, a meta-analysis cannot provide compelling evidence for
the presence of a disputed eﬀect if the individual studies are
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FIGURE 3 | Results of the Bayesian bias correction (BBC) reanalysis of the religious priming studies. In the (left), we display the prior (gray) and posterior
(black) probabilities of eight possible scenarios that result from the combination of four possible bias processes and two states of nature (to wit, that there is a real
effect [+] vs. that there is no effect [–]). The greatest positive change, and the largest resulting posterior probability, is seen in model 3+. This model includes a
biasing process whereby non-significant results are published at a smaller, but nonzero rate. Additionally, it includes a true effect. The high posterior likelihood on this
model implies that a true effect exists. In the (right), we display the prior and posterior distributions of this effect size. The gray dashed line and gray bar indicate the
prior distribution of the effect size, with a 50% probability of it being exactly 0 and a 50% probability of it being somewhere in the domain of the normal distribution. In
the (black) posterior distribution, the point mass at 0 has vanished as the mass of the posterior has accumulated around 0.3. As a result, the Bayes factor favoring
the null hypothesis is practically 0, indicating strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis that there is an effect of religious priming.
prone to experimenter bias eﬀects. In other words, if there is
a true eﬀect, then a meta-analysis will pick it up. But a meta-
analysis will also indicate the existence of an eﬀect if there
is no true eﬀect but only experimenter bias and QRPs, which
result in Type I error inﬂation and the overestimation of eﬀect
sizes.
With respect to religious priming, we argue that the Shariﬀ
et al. (2015) meta-analysis cannot provide the evidence that is
required to convince the skeptic that religious priming exists. The
signiﬁcant result that was obtained by combining the data from
many studies may merely reﬂect the fact that some proportion of
these experiments suﬀer from publication and experimenter bias
to an unknown degree.
Recommendation
In our opinion, the only compelling remedy against the pervasive
problem of experimenter bias and publication bias is the use
of large-scale preregistered replication attempts such as those
supported by the OSF and the Registered Replication Reports
initiative (Simons et al., 2014; see also Chambers, 2013; Nosek
and Lakens, 2014). We do not, however, wish to convey
the impression that we believe meta-analyses are useless. For
scientiﬁc purposes, meta-analyses can be highly informative, even
when the underlying studies are prone to experimenter bias.
Again, we would like to compliment Shariﬀ et al. (2015) for
their tremendous eﬀort in taking the issue of religious priming
seriously. Although we have highlighted several concerns, the
Shariﬀ et al. (2015) meta-analysis provides a valuable starting
point and recommendations for future studies with respect to
sample size and potential moderators.
First, Shariﬀ et al. (2015) provide an eﬀect size estimate for
religious priming, which can be used to guide future research.
Starting from the most optimistic eﬀect size estimate reported
in the meta-analysis (i.e., g = 0.40; reﬂecting the overall eﬀect
of religious priming uncorrected for publication bias across
all studies irrespective of the dependent measure), a simple
calculation indicates that in order to achieve 80% power in a
between-subject design (experimental vs. control condition), one
needs to test a total of 156 participants. When prosocial behavior
is used as dependent variable, the eﬀect size estimate (corrected
for publication bias) is g = 0.18, which, in order to obtain 80%
power, requires a total of 766 participants to detect an eﬀect2. This
demonstrates that many studies in the ﬁeld of ‘religious priming’
research are severely underpowered. Future studies would do
well to use suﬃciently large samples in order to demonstrate an
eﬀect of religious priming, preferably by using preregistration
and collaboration between diﬀerent labs.
Second, the meta-analysis by Shariﬀ et al. (2015) suggests that
religious priming works selectively for religious participants and
when explicit rather than implicit priming methods are used.
These are interesting and concrete suggestions that call for a
direct, conﬁrmatory test in a many-labs replication study; ideally,
such a study also takes into account the potential moderating
role of cultural context (e.g., secular vs. religious countries) and
controls for other moderators, such as gender, socio-economic
status, and income.
2Only one study in the meta-analysis actually meets this criterion, but in that study
no overall religious priming-eﬀect was observed (i.e., religious priming increased
prosocial behavior for Protestant participants, decreased prosocial behavior for
Catholic participants, and did not aﬀect prosocial behavior for participants coming
from a diﬀerent religious denomination; Benjamin et al., 2010).
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Interestingly, a recent high-powered and pre-registered
replication attempt of study 2 of Shariﬀ and Norenzayan (2007)
showed a null-result: religious priming did not result in more
prosocial behavior (Gomes and McCullough, 2015). In addition,
a pre-registered study on religious priming on prosocial behavior
from our own lab, using two large samples of highly religious
Dutch and US participants also failed to show an eﬀect (Maij
and van Elk, in preparation). Note, however, that these studies
diﬀered from the original study in terms of experimental design
and procedure. Future studies should aim to systematically
determine the potential boundary conditions of religious priming
eﬀects on prosocial behavior. We hope that the original authors
and other researchers will participate in such an endeavor,
possibly in the form of amany-labs adversarial collaboration (e.g.,
Matzke et al., 2015). Only after eliminating experimenter bias and
researcher’s degrees of freedom, can we establish whether religion
indeed makes nicer people.
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